

THE ECONOMIC DIVIDEND OF COORDINATED HOMES

How a scheduled home-care economy could reduce waste, strengthen local businesses, and preserve housing wealth

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The economic promise of Home Coordination is that the same household dollar could accomplish more. A contractor could spend less time searching for work and more time completing it. A homeowner could address an emerging problem before it becomes a larger one. A buyer could understand the condition of a property with less costly uncertainty. Together, those changes could make the residential service economy more productive and more dependable.

That would be economically valuable, but it should not be confused with an immediate economic boom. Most of the money moving through a coordinated system would already have been spent somewhere in the housing economy. The central opportunity is to reduce the resources consumed by disorganization, then use the released capacity for useful work. New services and additional investment could follow, but their value must be established separately from the value of transactions already occurring.

This paper estimates the possible effects on the economy surrounding homes. Under a central illustrative model, a network of 10,000 participating homes could organize \$40 million of annual work and produce approximately \$1.2 million in net annual resource savings after the cost of running the coordination system. At 100,000 homes, the same economics would imply \$400 million of organized work and \$12 million of annual net savings. These are conditional scenarios, not measured results or predictions of adoption.

The larger benefit could emerge over years: more stable service businesses, fewer preventable losses, and a housing stock whose condition is better understood. Whether that becomes a broad economic expansion depends on how efficiently the system operates and what people do with the time and money it releases.

An existing economy, waiting to become better organized

Residential care already operates at substantial scale. Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies projected in July 2026 that annual homeowner improvement and repair spending would reach approximately \$519 billion through mid-2027, while annual growth slowed to 0.5 percent. Its LIRA

measure covers owner-occupied homes and includes professionally installed and do-it-yourself work. It is a useful sector benchmark, not a measure of revenue available to one coordinator.

Harvard JCHS, July 23, 2026 forecast • LIRA methodology

The Census Bureau estimated approximately 86.985 million owner-occupied housing units in the second quarter of 2026. Taken together, these figures establish the order of magnitude: tens of millions of households supporting hundreds of billions of dollars in activity. Dividing the spending benchmark by the housing count yields roughly \$6,000 per owner-occupied unit, but the periods and definitions differ, and an average conceals substantial variation. It is a scale check, not a household budget recommendation.

U.S. Census Bureau, Q2 2026, Table 3

A scheduled home-care economy could touch services beyond the Harvard benchmark, including recurring gardening and some household support. This paper does not add separate industry totals to the \$519 billion figure. Those totals could overlap, include commercial customers, or measure supplier sales already embedded in contractor invoices. A credible estimate must begin by counting each economic activity once.

The important observation is that demand does not need to be invented. Homes already deteriorate, require maintenance, and undergo improvement. Coordination would change how that demand becomes visible and how efficiently the market responds. In a period of slow expenditure growth, increasing the useful output obtained from existing spending may matter more than increasing spending itself.

What would actually be created?

Three economic effects need to be distinguished. Existing work can move into a more organized channel without creating additional output. Waste can be removed, allowing the same useful result to be achieved with fewer resources. Additional worthwhile work can become feasible because the household has more confidence or the provider has more available capacity. These effects have different meanings and should not be added indiscriminately.

If a \$20,000 roof replacement moves from an independent referral to a coordinated network, the network has organized \$20,000 of activity. It has not created \$20,000 of new economic output. If better preparation eliminates unnecessary visits and material waste, there is a productivity gain. If those efficiencies allow the roofer to undertake another needed project, useful production can increase, provided the new job does not merely displace work elsewhere.

A household may also become better off while spending less. Avoiding a needless replacement reduces the contractor’s immediate sales but preserves the owner’s money and prevents unnecessary resource use. That can be a good outcome even if measured industry revenue declines. The proper objective is useful housing services and durable assets, rather than the largest possible invoice total.

New coordination businesses would create a new line of revenue, but their fees are initially an additional expense for somebody else. They earn an economic justification when the value of their service exceeds the labor and technology consumed in delivering it. The distinction between a fee and a resource cost becomes important when calculating the system’s net benefit.

A local model: the economic effect of 10,000 homes

For a transparent regional scenario, assume 10,000 participating suburban homes each generate \$8,000 a year in relevant paid maintenance and improvement work, averaged across quiet years and major projects. Assume half of that work enters a coordinated pipeline. The resulting annual volume is \$40 million. Both the expenditure level and the participation share are modeling assumptions; neither is a measured Potomac Lux customer average.

The scenario excludes mortgages, utilities, and property taxes. It also excludes home sale prices. These are economically important flows, but they are not contractor work produced by Home Coordination. The \$40 million represents a baseline value of work exposed to better planning, before deducting efficiency gains. It should not later be described as realized provider receipts if some unnecessary work is avoided or prices fall.

The table tests three levels of gross resource savings against an assumed coordination operating cost equal to 2 percent of that baseline volume. The operating cost includes the labor and infrastructure required to run the system. It assumes a mature, efficient delivery model; an early concierge operation could cost substantially more.

Gross savings assumption	Gross resources saved	System resource cost	Net annual saving
3% Modest	\$1.20 million	\$0.80 million	\$0.40 million
5% Central	\$2.00 million	\$0.80 million	\$1.20 million
8% Strong	\$3.20 million	\$0.80 million	\$2.40 million

Illustrative assumptions and calculations; not observed outcomes.

At the central 5 percent efficiency assumption, the network releases \$2 million of resources and consumes \$800,000 to provide coordination, leaving \$1.2 million of net annual resource savings. That is

\$120 per participating home before assigning a value to homeowner time or claiming any benefit from longer asset life. The estimate is meaningful, but it is deliberately much smaller than the \$40 million flowing through the work pipeline.

The model also has a clear failure condition. If actual resource savings are only 1 percent and the system consumes 2 percent, the network uses an additional \$400,000 of resources. Convenience or improved quality might still justify the service, but a claim that coordination lowers total economic cost would not be supported. Actual costs must be measured rather than hidden behind automation assumptions.

Where the savings would come from

The central 5 percent estimate can be expressed as three distinct savings targets. Better routing and purchasing account for 2 percent of baseline work value. Fewer avoidable repeat visits and redundant interventions account for 1.5 percent. Lower provider search and administrative effort account for another 1.5 percent. On \$40 million, those targets equal \$800,000, \$600,000, and \$600,000 respectively. They are an illustrative allocation of the same \$2 million pool, not additional benefits.

A scheduled pipeline gives providers information before the work becomes urgent. Nearby appointments can be grouped when households agree. Equipment and materials can be checked before a crew arrives. A provider can prepare for a sequence of similar jobs instead of responding to each one as an unrelated surprise. The savings would come from actual reductions in miles, delays, or wasted materials, rather than simply demanding lower prices from the contractor.

The home record addresses a different form of waste. A professional can see what has already been investigated and why a prior repair was chosen. A recurring stain need not trigger the same unsuccessful patch because earlier findings disappeared. Documentation cannot eliminate diagnosis, but it can reduce unnecessary repetition. Evidence of fewer repeat visits would be stronger than a claim that the software has become more intelligent.

Administrative savings are equally practical. A provider may need fewer speculative estimates when the scope and homeowner authorization are already clear. Household time is treated separately and excluded from this savings pool. To avoid double counting, a saved hour must belong to one category in the economic model. The same avoided visit cannot simultaneously become a routing saving, a labor saving, and a separate rework saving.

Who receives the economic dividend?

Lower system cost does not guarantee lower homeowner bills. The benefit may be retained by providers, paid to the coordinator, or passed to households. Competition and contract design determine

the distribution. This is central to the economics: a system can improve aggregate efficiency while giving one participant little immediate financial benefit.

Suppose 60 percent of the central \$2 million gross savings reaches homeowners through lower expenditure, while providers retain 40 percent through lower costs. Households receive \$1.2 million and providers receive \$800,000. If the coordinator charges households another \$1.2 million, equal to 3 percent of baseline work volume, the homeowner group breaks even on direct cash savings. The coordinator consumes \$800,000 in resources and retains a \$400,000 operating surplus. Provider gains of \$800,000 plus coordinator surplus of \$400,000 reconcile to the \$1.2 million system benefit.

This example is not a pricing recommendation. It exposes a constraint: a premium concierge fee can easily exceed the direct cash savings generated by scheduling alone. On \$4,000 of coordinated work per home, a \$59 monthly membership costs \$708 a year, or 17.7 percent of work volume, before project fees. That cannot honestly be sold as self-funding from a modeled 5 percent efficiency gain. Such a membership needs additional value through service, time savings, or demonstrable risk reduction.

A widely adopted infrastructure model may therefore need lower administrative costs and a different pricing structure from personal concierge service. Household time can have considerable value, but it should be presented separately. Six net hours saved annually across 10,000 households equals 60,000 hours. At an assumed \$50 per hour, that is \$3 million of time value, not \$3 million deposited into household accounts or automatically added to GDP.

Stability: the value of a pipeline before it becomes an emergency

Contractors usually have more control over how they perform a job than over when customers decide to request it. Better demand visibility can narrow that uncertainty. Confirmed maintenance appointments help businesses plan staffing and supplies. Longer-range forecasts can inform capacity decisions, provided they remain clearly separate from authorized bookings.

The distinction prevents a new kind of instability. An aging roof is a potential need; a homeowner considering replacement is a prospective customer; a signed, scheduled project is a commercial commitment. Treating all three as guaranteed revenue would encourage premature hiring and inventory purchases. The coordination system should improve the quality of the pipeline, with cancellation assumptions that providers can understand.

Even modest reductions in wasted overhead can matter to small businesses. NAHB reported an average remodeler net profit margin of 6.3 percent for 2024. At that margin, a hypothetical \$1 million business earns \$63,000. Saving an additional \$10,000 in genuine costs without reducing its useful output would

increase that profit by nearly 16 percent. This illustrates operating sensitivity; it does not establish that coordination will deliver the saving or that every trade has the same margin.

NAHB, April 10, 2026: remodeler profitability

Payment discipline could also release working capital. A hypothetical provider billing \$600,000 annually that reduces average collection time by 15 days frees approximately \$24,700 from receivables. That is a one-time reduction in funds tied up, not recurring revenue. At an assumed 8 percent annual financing cost, the corresponding financing benefit is roughly \$2,000 a year. Clear closeout documentation can help, but faster payment still depends on the actual contract and payer behavior.

A local pipeline cannot eliminate a recession or a weather shock. Many households can defer discretionary work at the same time, and storms can generate correlated emergencies. Coordination could smooth controllable scheduling friction while leaving these larger risks intact. Its economic strength would be improved preparedness, not immunity from the business cycle.

The surrounding markets: more useful business, less wasted activity

The first beneficiaries could be the trades and recurring service providers. A gardener with a dependable seasonal route and a contractor with a prepared project schedule gain a better basis for allocating labor. Suppliers may benefit from earlier, more accurate orders. Some emergency freight and excess inventory could fall, although those reductions are savings for customers and lower revenue for the businesses currently selling them.

Real estate professionals could gain a more efficient preparation and handover process. A usable home history may shorten the effort required to establish what work occurred and what remains unresolved. Inspectors could spend more time evaluating current condition and less time reconstructing facts. Builders could supply a record at handover that future providers extend, creating demand for documentation services with a clear operational purpose.

There could also be additional useful work. As an illustration, a 5 percent increase in completed, justified projects relative to the local \$40 million baseline would add \$2 million in annual provider sales. This would be newly activated spending within the participating group, not necessarily new spending for the region: households might have reduced other purchases, or providers might have displaced other customers. It is excluded from the core savings estimate because those offsets are unknown.

Employment should be treated with the same discipline. If direct labor represents an assumed 30 percent of the \$40 million baseline and a full-time labor equivalent costs \$100,000 annually, the activity supports roughly 120 labor equivalents. Those are jobs supported by existing work, not 120 new jobs created by the platform. The illustrative extra \$2 million of activity would support six additional

equivalents under the same assumptions, but net job creation requires evidence of unused capacity and genuinely additional demand.

The effect on every adjacent market will not be positive. Businesses dependent on expensive lead sales, avoidable emergency premiums, or redundant work could lose revenue. That is part of the proposed productivity gain. The economic test is whether resources move toward more useful work and whether customers retain meaningful choice, rather than whether every existing business model is preserved.

Housing value: preserving wealth and reducing uncertainty

The strongest case for an effect on housing wealth is physical preservation. If earlier attention prevents a small water problem from becoming extensive damage, the household avoids a real loss. Repeating that result across properties could preserve significant value over time. Establishing the amount would require comparisons with similar homes outside the program, adjusted for condition and maintenance spending.

A simple sensitivity shows the scale without pretending to establish causation. If better coordination reduced expected annual avoidable damage by \$100 to \$300 per home, 10,000 homes would avoid \$1 million to \$3 million in expected losses. Those figures are assumed changes in expected losses, not guaranteed yearly insurance savings. They are excluded from the central model because they may overlap with fewer repairs or repeat interventions already counted there.

Documentation can also affect the uncertainty surrounding a sale. A buyer who can examine credible repair history has a different starting point from a buyer facing unexplained symptoms and missing invoices. Better information might reduce negotiation friction or support greater confidence in a well-maintained property. It might also reveal a defect and lower the offer. An honest record improves price discovery; it does not guarantee a higher price.

For perspective, a 0.5 percent change in a \$1 million sale price is \$5,000. Across 100 otherwise comparable sales, that would shift \$500,000 in transaction value. This is arithmetic, not an estimated premium. A higher price is also not automatically new productive output: it can reflect a transfer between buyer and seller or the capitalization of expected future benefits. It should not be added to annual savings as a separate economic windfall.

Over time, buyers could begin distinguishing documented stewardship from attractive presentation. That could reward sustained care, but regional housing prices would still depend heavily on supply and financing conditions. Home Coordination cannot build missing housing supply by itself, and a history record is not a substitute for an independent inspection. Its plausible monetary contribution is better preservation and better information within the market that already exists.

The scale around Washington, Maryland, and Virginia

Montgomery County and Fairfax County provide a concrete regional reference. Census QuickFacts reports 389,210 households and a 65.3 percent owner-occupied rate for Montgomery County, and 414,101 households and a 68.6 percent rate for Fairfax County, using 2020–2024 estimates. Multiplying household counts by the respective rates gives approximately 538,000 owner-occupied households combined. This is a broad reference population, not a count of customers who can or will purchase coordination.

Census QuickFacts: Montgomery County • Census QuickFacts: Fairfax County

Against that reference, 10,000 participating homes represent approximately 1.9 percent of owners, while 100,000 represent about 18.6 percent. The latter would require extensive adoption across providers and probably a lower-cost model accessible beyond premium concierge clients. Countywide scale also says little about routing efficiency: dispersed customers can create volume without creating useful neighborhood density.

Participating homes	Annual work organized	Net annual resource saving
1,000	\$4 million	\$120,000
10,000	\$40 million	\$1.2 million
100,000	\$400 million	\$12 million

Illustrative assumptions and calculations; not observed outcomes.

These figures describe a maturing coordination network, potentially involving multiple businesses and interoperable systems. They are not a forecast that Potomac Lux alone will recruit those households. Under the central assumptions, a 10,000-home network can already have a meaningful effect on selected local providers. A 100,000-home network could begin influencing how the region organizes residential work, but the same savings percentage cannot be assumed to hold without continuing measurement.

The early economic objective should therefore be density and verified outcomes. A concentrated group of homes sharing service routes may generate more operational value than a larger group scattered across the DMV. Local proof gives the broader thesis a factual basis: lower cost per completed task, fewer unsuccessful interventions, and a more dependable flow of authorized work.

National consequences: a productivity gain before a boom

A national sensitivity can be built from the \$519 billion homeowner spending benchmark. Suppose organized coordination eventually touches 1 percent, 5 percent, or 10 percent of that annual expenditure. Apply the same central assumption of 5 percent gross resource savings and 2 percent coordination resource cost. The net gain is 3 percent of the spending exposed to coordination, not 3 percent of the entire housing economy.

Benchmark spending covered	Annual work exposed	Net annual resource saving
1%	\$5.19 billion	\$155.7 million
5%	\$25.95 billion	\$778.5 million
10%	\$51.90 billion	\$1,557.0 million

Illustrative assumptions and calculations; not observed outcomes.

At 10 percent spending coverage, that would mean approximately \$51.9 billion of organized activity and \$1.56 billion of annual net resource savings. This is substantial sector value but does not, by itself, establish a national economic boom. It also assumes that the part of expenditure coordinated can realize the modeled savings; the Harvard benchmark includes do-it-yourself activity and categories that may be less suitable. The coverage percentages are hypothetical expenditure shares, not expected adoption rates.

The larger economic effect depends on reinvestment. A contractor might use saved hours to complete more productive work, a household might spend its savings elsewhere, or the money might remain in reserve. Some benefits would appear as higher measured output, others as lower costs or additional leisure. Applying an arbitrary multiplier would blur those distinctions, so this paper makes no GDP multiplier claim.

There is also a capacity constraint. If coordination makes many households seek the same scarce trade at once, prices could initially rise. A pipeline becomes stabilizing when it supports training, capacity planning, and flexible timing. Forecasting demand without expanding or better allocating supply can simply make the queue more visible.

What has to be true for the economic case to hold

The system must make care easier without consuming the savings in administration. That requires records providers can update during normal work and service obligations proportionate to the price. At the local model’s \$4,000 of annual coordinated work per household, a 2 percent operating-cost

allowance is only \$80 per home per year. That is an ambitious infrastructure cost assumption, not a realistic budget for unlimited personal concierge attention. A more expensive service must deliver correspondingly greater value.

Participation also needs to remain competitive. Providers should be able to contribute without surrendering every customer relationship to one intermediary. Households should be able to take their records elsewhere. If one platform captures the entire productivity dividend through excessive fees, the system may create a profitable company without producing the broad economic benefit described here.

The empirical test is straightforward. Compare participating homes with reasonably similar homes outside the system, measuring total household expenditure inclusive of fees and the condition achieved. Track provider time and costs to determine whether the same useful work requires fewer resources. Examine recurring problems over a sufficiently long period to avoid mistaking deferred work for a saving. A full seasonal cycle can begin testing routing and scheduling; claims about asset life require years.

The strongest version of Home Coordination would make a measurable contribution to the real economy: preserve useful housing, release scarce skilled labor from avoidable work, and make future demand easier to serve. It could support healthier businesses and more resilient household budgets without requiring everyone to spend more. That is the economic dividend worth pursuing, and the standard against which the idea should be judged.

Model notes and sources

All modeled amounts are annual U.S. dollars unless stated otherwise, expressed on a constant planning-price basis without inflation escalation. The local model uses participating homes $\times$ \$8,000 relevant annual paid work $\times$ 50 percent coordinated share. Gross savings equal baseline coordinated work $\times$ 3, 5, or 8 percent; net resource savings subtract 2 percent of baseline work for system operation. Fees are transfers between participants and are separated from resource costs. These illustrative percentages have not been validated using Potomac Lux operations.

The core totals exclude homeowner time, newly activated projects, and changes in property prices. Avoided damage is also excluded because of potential overlap with repair savings. Gross contractor sales, supplier receipts, and labor compensation are not added together as independent output. The analysis offers conditional economic scenarios rather than a benefit-cost study, company revenue forecast, or estimate of national GDP impact.

Sources were checked on September 2, 2026. The Census quarterly PDF uses a rolling URL; the version consulted is the July 28, 2026 release for the second quarter of 2026. Primary source links appear beside the relevant claims.